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Why Reform Fails: The ‘Politics of Policies’ in Costa 
Rican Telecommunications Liberalization  
Bert Hoffmann 
Economic liberalization became the dominant economic paradigm in Latin Amer-
ica in the 1980s and all through the 1990s. In what is known as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Williamson 1990), a set of policy measures towards deregulation and 
market-oriented reforms was spelled out and politically backed by the key Wash-
ington-based international actors, namely the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. 
government. Though this paradigm swept the continent, largely dismantling the 
structures of the more state interventionist development model that had preceded it, 
disillusion has now set in. Economic results have not been all that was hoped for, 
and in many cases social polarization has increased, rather than decreased. Opinion 
polls show growing discontent with the political elites committed to economic lib-
eralism, and in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador this has led to the electoral victo-
ries of candidates promising a reversal of liberalizing policies. If liberalization has 
been the ‘latest project of modernity’ embraced by the continent’s elites (White-
head 2006, 194), the pendulum in its public perception and political viability seems 
to be swinging back. Some revision has also begun within the Washington-based 
international financial institutions (IFIs). Among these, the 2006 report of the In-
ter-American Development Bank (IDB) stands out as it focuses – according to its 
title – on The Politics of Policies (IDB 2005). The report’s key argument is that a 
policy design of one-size-fits-all is an excessively technocratic approach; instead 
the authors’ premise is that ‘the processes of discussing, approving, and imple-
menting policies may be at least as important as the specific content of the policies 
themselves’ (IDB 2005, 3).  
 This article undertakes a case study of these ‘politics of policies’ in a core ele-
ment of the reform agenda, the liberalization of state-run telecommunications. Al-
though the IDB report essentially looks at this process from the perspectives of 
policy-makers, this article will do so from a broader analytical angle. Not only can 
there be an overly technocratic approach to policy formulation but also to the 
analysis of the politics of reform, if it understands these as a mere question of po-
litical engineering. In contrast, this study will re-link the process dynamics of pol-
icy reform to its content.  
 The particular case under scrutiny merits a word of explanation. For half a cen-
tury, the political and ideological importance of the ‘Costa Rican model’ has far 
outweighed the limited economic significance of this small Central American 
country with a population of only four million. However, in many ways the coun-
try can serve as a paradigmatic case. With its stable political democracy and its 
high human development standards, Costa Rica has been Latin America’s ‘show-
case democracy’ and a model for socially inclusive capitalist development in a 
resource-poor Third World country, often termed ‘social-democratic’ (Wilson 
1998) or ‘mixed model’ (Mesa-Lago 2000). This characterization corresponds with 
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a widespread perception in the country itself. As modern Costa Rica’s ‘founding 
father’ José ‘Pepe’ Figueres Ferrer once put it: ‘Costa Rica is not a country. [...] It 
is a project. It is an experiment’ (Ernst and Schmidt 1986, 58).  
The transformation of the telecommunications regime in Latin America 
The analytical concept of telecommunications regimes binds together the specific 
configurations of economic, social and political actors and regulatory frameworks 
– including structures of ownership and market, pricing schemes and patterns of 
diffusion and consumption in any given country or region. In the following we 
sketch three different ideal types of telecommunications regimes, which provide 
the conceptual backdrop for the following analysis: the state-centred First World 
telecommunications regime typical of the industrialized countries up to the 1970s 
and ’80s; the traditional state-centred Third World telecommunications regime; and 
the liberalized telecommunications regime that became such a forceful paradigm in 
the 1980s and ’90s, challenging both of the above and often replacing them. 
 This approach links the telecommunications sector1 to general economic and 
social development patterns. In the context of the state-centred First World regime, 
telecommunications were regarded as a ‘natural monopoly’: an industry that had 
such extraordinarily high sunk investments, with only long-term amortization, and 
such a high degree of economies of scale and scope, that it was considered too 
costly to have competing providers investing in duplicate infrastructure. Public 
monopolies took charge of telecommunications, usually under the Ministries of 
Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT).2 Characteristic of this type of telecommuni-
cations regime was the state’s commitment to achieve universal service; invest-
ment focused on the continuous expansion of the network with the goal of provid-
ing residential telephone main lines for every household. The pricing scheme gen-
erally was based on cross-subsidies from long-distance to local calls, from business 
to residential users, and from urban to rural areas.  
 In the course of the ‘developmentalist’ projects of the post-WWII period, Latin 
American governments turned foreign-owned telecommunications companies into 
state-run monopolies. Telecommunications became widely regarded as an integral 
part of the nation’s public infrastructure, and nationalization as part of the realiza-
tion of national sovereignty. The adopted telecommunications regime copied parts 
of the First World model – public monopolies, cross-subsidization schemes –, but 
failed on others, namely to extend the telephone network to the citizenry at large or 
to bridge the gap between urban and rural areas. National development plans did 
not assign telecommunications investments first priority. Instead, the state monop-
oly company proved to be a profitable cash cow, routinely transferring as much as 
30 to 40 per cent of its revenues to the treasury (Saunders et al. 1994, 34). As a 
consequence, the public telecommunications companies suffered a chronic capital 
drain that greatly reduced their capacity to invest, expand and innovate. Diffusion 
and quality of telephone networks in the Third World generally remained poor. 
Year-long waiting lists for main line telephone installation became the landmark 
illustration of the deficiencies of state-run monopolies under these conditions. 
Characteristically, the state-centred Third World telecommunications regime main-
tained a strong bias geographically in favour of the urban areas, and socially in 
favour of the upper and middle classes (Clippinger 1976, ITU 1984).  
 In the First World, the U.S. government laid the cornerstone of a new, liberal-
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ized telecommunications regime when it broke up the AT&T monopoly in 1984. In 
Latin America, telecommunications liberalization came in the wake of the foreign 
debt crisis and the structural adjustment programmes negotiated with the IMF and 
the World Bank (ITU 1991, Bull 2005). However, initial steps were more timid 
than in other sectors. The continent-wide ‘wave’ of telecom liberalization did not 
fully hit Latin America until the beginning of the 1990s. The driving force for di-
vestiture of the state-owned monopolies was less a policy choice weighing the pros 
and cons of each model, but rather the fact that ‘a decade of economic crises during 
the 1980s left many Latin American governments strapped for cash and unable to 
resist the demands of financial institutions’, as the ITU, which had a key role in the 
international promotion of the liberalization paradigm, puts it (ITU 1991, 2).3 As a 
result, governments rather than national business became the key force pushing for 
telecommunication privatization.4 It thus followed the traditional Latin American 
pattern of reform ‘from above and without’ (Whitehead 2006, 165).  
 In some cases privatization came through the sale of the state-owned compa-
nies; in others it was a process of exposing the state carrier to private sector com-
petition. Looking back, the ITU had to note that privatization and liberalization 
were not necessarily concomitant as in most Latin American countries ‘privatiza-
tion came hand in hand with a lack of competition in basic services [...]. What re-
sulted [...] was merely the replacement of a public monopoly by a private one’ 
(ITU 2000, 2-3) – an outcome described as the ‘typical Latin American model of 
privatization’ (Raventos 1998, 1).5  
Being a market-driven model, the liberalized telecommunications regime’s in-
trinsic focus is on consumer demand endowed with purchasing power rather 
than on developmental goals. While waiting lists for telephone installation dis-
appeared, prices became the key to access. Here, the elimination of cross-
subsidies and the ‘rebalancing’ of tariffs led to a considerable rise in the rates 
for domestic calls.6  
In the ‘politics of policies’ of opening up the sector, the proponents of liberaliza-
tion could point to the poor performance of the public monopoly carrier – a key 
reason for the only limited opposition to its liberalization. If we now turn to the 
Costa Rican case, we will see that here a more inclusive development model went 
hand in hand with a more inclusive telecommunications regime; and that where the 
public carrier lived up to its social and developmental function, the ‘politics of 
policies’ of its liberalization also took a strikingly different course. 
Socially inclusive telecommunications in the Third World: the Costa  
Rican model 
Costa Rica won an international reputation as a model country as much by its ex-
traordinary political stability as by its far above average performance in nearly all 
social indicators, compared to other Third World countries (UNDP 2006). Public 
health and educational services are accessible for the population at large, and the 
average life expectancy of 78.3 years is not only higher than in the rest of Latin 
America, but also above that of nations like Denmark or Portugal (UNDP 2006, 
283). These achievements are all the more remarkable as Costa Rica is a resource-
poor country with only a medium level of GDP/capita and a relatively large share 
of the population living in rural areas. 
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 The underlying political structures go back to 1948, when a governing board 
under the leadership of José ‘Pepe’ Figueres, which emerged victorious from a 
short civil war, laid the political and economic foundations of a socio-economic 
model often termed ‘social-democratic’ (Wilson 1988). Following the ‘develop-
mentalist’ ideas of the UN’s Economic Commission on Latin America, CEPAL, 
the state took over a central role in the economy, and an import-substituting indus-
try (ISI) was established, primarily in consumer products, light industry and agro-
industrial sectors (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 185-191). Of no less importance for 
Costa Rica’s social cohesion, however, were a series of structural reforms to sup-
port small and medium farmers, including gradual agrarian reform and the estab-
lishment of public institutions for technical support and price regulation. These 
policies ensured the persistence of a relatively broad rural middle class, which has 
been a key factor for the stability of Costa Rican society (Seligson 1984). 
 On the political-institutional side, the most spectacular measure was the aboli-
tion of the country’s military, enshrined in the Constitution of 1949. This step was 
essential for the long-run viability of Figueres’ reform project, since it eliminated 
precisely that institution to which anti-reformist elements across Latin America 
resorted when they felt their interests threatened. Moreover, it paved the way for 
electoral, civilian rule, which for more than half a century has never been seriously 
disrupted by violence or electoral fraud. A stable two-party-system emerged. De-
spite a rather regular pattern of alternation in power, the Partido Liberación Na-
cional (PLN), formed in 1951 by Figueres, dominated the political agenda even 
when its opponents held the presidency. The rival second party existed in different 
constellations and under different names, but since 1983 as Partido Unidad Social 
Cristiana (PUSC). While being moderately more conservative, it shared the basic 
consensus on the country’s overall socio-economic model.  
 A centrepiece amongst the model’s ‘founding institutions’ was the Costa Rican 
Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE), created in 1949. 
The ICE not only was the state monopoly company for energy generation and elec-
tricity supply, but also for the nation’s telecommunications system – a nearly 
unique combination internationally. It provided the energy resources for the state-
led development and industrialization plans that started in the 1950s; and it ful-
filled a central social function by investing great sums in a continuous push for a 
geographically and socially inclusive system of electricity provision. As electricity 
was a key concern for all sectors of society, the ICE became probably the most 
emblematic institution of the Costa Rican development model.  
 Although telecommunications for a long time appeared as the smaller sister of 
ICE’s electricity activities, here, too, the institution made great strides in the na-
tionwide extension of the network, following the same pattern of geographical and 
social inclusion as the power grid (ICE 1997b). The ICE subsidized rates for tele-
phone access and domestic calls, and engaged in outreach programmes for rural 
areas, including the installation of public call offices on a concessionary basis in 
small towns and villages, forerunners of today’s internet cafés. In contrast to the 
prevailing approach in most of the Third World, the Costa Rican model saw tele-
communications not as a luxury item for the urban elites, but as a core function of 
national integration and development. As a result, Costa Rica enjoys one of the 
densest and socially most balanced telephone networks of all developing countries 
(ITU 2006). The country’s telecommunications regime thus greatly departs from 
the typical Third World mould. In line with its exceptional overall development 
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model, the diffusion and access patterns of telecommunications instead resemble 
those of the inclusive state-centred telecommunications regime of the First World, 
though implemented under the conditions of a poor country. 
 As a consequence, unlike other Third World countries, where the chronic defi-
ciencies of the telephone system provided a strong argument for dismantling the 
state monopoly, in Costa Rica even outspoken advocates of liberalization like Tac-
san (2001) cannot but pay respect to the historic achievements of the ICE:  
No doubt, it accomplished an extraordinary job of networking the whole coun-
try with telephone lines [...]. In Costa Rica, one out of five persons has a tele-
phone line which means that virtually every house owns one. The difference is 
certainly radical if compared to the neighbouring Central American countries 
where one out of 20 persons has access to a phone line. The data is significant 
in the sense that it shows the excellent performance of ICE in the provision of 
basic line communication in Costa Rica.  
Similarly, Ricardo Monge, the coordinator of the telecommunications liberalization 
bill in 2000 that was designed to open up the sector (see below), underscores the 
extraordinary standing the state-owned energy and telecommunications company 
enjoys: ‘The ICE is the institution par excellence for Costa Rican national pride’.7  
Liberalizing telecommunications: the politics of reform failure 
The drive for economic liberalization policies in Costa Rica began, as elsewhere, in 
the wake of the foreign debt crisis.8 It was a PLN government that signed the first 
stabilization agreement with the IMF in 1982, which marked the beginning of a 
long process of structural adjustment programmes. In line with the ‘standard reci-
pes’ of the Washington-based IFIs, these encompassed the reduction of state ex-
penditures to lower the budget deficit, the reduction of subsidies, the adoption of a 
strategy of export-led growth, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises.  
 Nevertheless, these policies retained a more gradual and heterodox approach 
than in other countries. If this was partly due to the political-institutional structures 
inclined to consensus and negotiated compromise, externally Costa Rica benefited 
from its role as Washington’s prime ideological counter-model against Central 
America’s left-wing revolutionaries. Direct U.S. aid flows increased greatly, cover-
ing more than 50 per cent of Costa Rica’s account deficit between 1982 and 1985 
(Fürst 1990, 190). U.S. policy was keen to avoid social destabilization in Costa 
Rica due to excessive reform pressure, resulting in the anomaly of an adjustment 
programme accompanied by an actual increase in real social expenditures (Mesa-
Lago 2000, 496).  
 In her comparative study of telecommunication reform in Central America, 
Bull (2005) points out that in Costa Rica USAID was the principal external actor 
pushing for the sector’s liberalization, whereas the direct ‘impact of the IFIs on the 
telecommunication process was marginal’ (Bull 2005, 125) compared to its 
neighbouring countries. This, however, may be an overstatement. While the Wash-
ington-based IFIs indeed were not explicitly demanding all-out telecommunica-
tions privatization, this should not mislead one into overlooking the enormous 
weight they had in the general turnaround of the development paradigm in Costa 
Rica. Of this, telecommunications liberalization was seen as an integral part, and 
Haglund (2006) presents a convincing analysis of the IMF and IDB policies to-
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wards Costa Rica and their importance for the drive to open up the telecom sector 
to the private sector.9  
 On the domestic side, for Costa Rica’s political system it was crucially impor-
tant that the PLN administrations of Luis Alberto Monge (1982-1986) and Óscar 
Arias (1986-1990) should steer this shift away from Costa Rica’s traditional devel-
opment model and set the course for a gradual, socially cushioned, yet continuous 
adoption of liberalization policies (Wilson 1994). As the study of Seligson (2002) 
shows, this went hand in hand with a gradual decline in public support for the es-
tablished party system, which, however did not translate into open challenges to 
the political establishment in the 1980s and ’90s. Nevertheless, the PLN did suffer 
internal tensions. Most notably, Óscar Arias’ planning minister, Otton Solís, quit 
his office in open conflict with Arias over the government’s embrace of liberaliza-
tion (18 years later they would face each other again in hard-fought presidential 
elections).  
 The pressures on state finances and the overall turn to liberalization did not 
bypass the country’s telecommunications sector. If in the following we track the 
‘politics of policies’ of liberalizing Costa Rican telecommunications,10 it is fair to 
start out with the Monge administration (1982-86). Although it did not include the 
ICE in any privatization scheme, it accelerated the drain of financial resources 
from the company to cover the growing public deficit. As Haglund (2006, 27-28) 
points out, the ICE, just as most of Costa Rica’s public autonomous institutions, 
ran a continuous surplus, which, however, was diverted into state coffers. As a 
consequence of this diversion, rather than its entrepreneurial inefficiencies, the 
company began to lose the capacity for the large-scale investments needed for the 
digitization and modernization of its infrastructure.  
 The following government of Óscar Arias (1986-1990) launched the first plan 
to privatize services offered by the ICE. In line with the gradualism of Costa Rican 
politics, the plan proposed the partial sale of company shares and the participation 
of private companies through strategic alliances. Protests from the ICE’s unions 
and other groups of the PLN’s social base quickly halted this initiative. In a differ-
ent line, the Arias government attempted to open up the state monopoly for mobile 
telephony, issuing a license for the U.S. company Millicom. However, Costa 
Rica’s audit office, the Contraloría General de la República, stepped in to block 
the arrangement after the ICE’s unions began a formal law suit against the license. 
Eventually Costa Rica’s constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court, the Sala 
Cuarta, declared the deal unconstitutional.11  
 In 1994, again a PLN government under President José María Figueres Olsen - 
the son of ‘founding father’ José ‘Pepe’ Figueres - set up a commission headed by 
former Central Bank President Eduardo Lizano, the country’s most vocal advocate 
of liberalization, to address the state’s domestic debt. The commission recom-
mended the sale of state assets, including the state electricity and telecommunica-
tions monopoly (Lizano 1997, 59). This, however, triggered immediate protests 
from so many sides, that Figueres shelved the commission’s recommendations. 
Instead, he sought bipartisan agreement on the overall course of liberalization 
which crystallized in the Figueres-Calderón pact, signed in 1995 by the incumbent 
president and his immediate predecessor. This pact became all the more symbolic as 
its signatories were the sons and political heirs of – precisely – José ‘Pepe’ Figueres 
Ferrer and Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, the two leaders who had stood against 
each other in the Civil War of 1948 which – after a decade of social and economic 
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change – gave birth to what came to be known as the ‘Costa Rican model’.  
 Regarding telecommunications, the Figueres government turned to a project 
that, rather than pursuing privatization via the sale of the ICE, sought to leave the 
company in place but break up its monopoly by inviting private competition 
(Monge 2000, 289f). The project encompassed three bills that were jointly intro-
duced in the National Assembly in September 1996: first, a new ‘organic law’ for 
the ICE that included the separation of the telecommunications and electricity sec-
tors, which would then operate as independent companies under the ICE, recast as 
a rather loose umbrella; second, a new law for the energy sector; and third, a new 
law for telecommunications. The telecommunications market was to be opened to 
private competition, with a gradualist schedule stretching over five years. How-
ever, these bills were introduced in the second half of Figueres’ term, when the 
upcoming elections dominated the calculations of parliamentarians of both parties. 
As it was widely felt that the ICE liberalization would be unpopular, both parties 
opted to avoid conflict and to postpone the initiative for the time being (Monge 
2000, 291). 
 After the 1998 elections, the newly elected President Miguel Angel Rodríguez 
(PUSC) inherited the pending liberalization bills. He presented the electricity bill 
directly to the National Assembly, but – learning from past failures – prior to sub-
mitting the other two bills he called for a consultation process, the Concertación 
Nacional. This forum included the government, business sectors, and the trade un-
ions as well as a range of civil society representatives. Although the PLN (arguing 
for more gradual liberalization) and the small party Fuerza Democrática denied 
their support, acceptance of the bill by the unions was seen as a breakthrough to-
wards the political viability of the project. On the basis of these accords, the gov-
ernment then introduced both bills into Parliament.  
 The telecom bill sped up the gradualist approach to liberalization, envisaging 
full competition in the sector as early as 2002. At the same time, it promised to 
continue the government’s social commitment through the establishment of a uni-
versal access fund, FOSUTEL, and a new regulatory body, ARETEL. The fund 
would be financed from obligatory contributions from all companies operating on 
the telecom market, amounting to 15 per cent of their earnings in the first four 
years and 40 per cent for the following years.  
 As a result of the ‘politics of policies’ described above, telecom liberalization 
was postponed for so long that the ‘contagion effect’ eventually turned negative. 
Costa Ricans could judge the liberalization experiences in other Latin American 
countries with the advantage of hindsight, noting that these often led to substantial 
rate increases in the tariffs for subscription and domestic calls – which compared 
unfavourably with ICE’s low tariffs on these services. Facing this problem the pro-
liberalization campaign sought refuge by focusing criticism of the state monopoly 
on its shortcomings regarding mobile phones and the new digital information tech-
nologies. 
 In the political arena, the refusal of the PLN and Fuerza Democrática to sign 
the national consultation accord led to a new round of negotiations, as the govern-
ing PUSC did not have a parliamentary majority. The PUSC as much as the PLN 
pushed for rapid progress, since both wanted to finish with the issue before the 
next long pre-electoral period would hamper implementation. In consequence, they 
agreed to modify the Legislative Assembly’s procedures to allow for a fast-track 
approach to the bill (Asamblea Legislativa 2000), as well as to modify the bill on 
10
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essentially two points: the time frame for the phased opening of the telecommuni-
cations market to competition was extended; and the agreement reached in the con-
sultation forum regarding the composition of the new regulatory body’s board was 
thrown out. Instead of the seven members agreed upon – two from government, two 
from business organizations, two from trade unions and one from the national com-
mission for the protection of consumer rights – the new version proposed a board of 
five members, all of which would be appointed by the government. As a result, the 
trade unions protested their exclusion and withdrew their support for the bill.  
 Another decision by the leaders of the two dominant parties bent on accelerat-
ing the process proved to be as relevant for the bill’s eventual failure: the decision 
to bundle the three separate bills – the law restructuring the ICE, the law on energy 
and the law on telecommunications – into a single project (which the media 
quickly labelled the Combo del ICE in allusion to the package deals offered by 
fast-food restaurants).12 The political rationale was that without such a package 
deal, the three projects could not pass before the end of parliamentary sessions in 
April 2000, threatening to have the issue stretching into pre-election times.  
 In terms of parliamentary process, the leadership agreements, fast-track pro-
ceedings and bill combination achieved their aim. On 20 March 2000, the Legisla-
tive Assembly passed the comprehensive reform law with ample majority: all 
PUSC and all but three PLN representatives voted in favour. Only the three PLN 
dissidents and the seven representatives of the small parties voted against it.13 Lib-
eralization became law – but not for long. 
 The passage of the Combo del ICE law by the Legislative Assembly proved to 
be a pyrrhic victory. The gradual erosion of public support for the established par-
ties, a tendency Seligson (2002) had diagnosed as going on since the 1980s, now 
broke out openly. The party leaderships had limited their ‘politics of policies’ cal-
culations to the political, media and business elites, while the popular perception of 
this project only entered calculations in so far as the decision was to be kept at a 
sufficient distance from election day. By brushing aside the consultation accords in 
the National Assembly negotiations, the bipartisan agreement not only ruined what 
had been the government’s greatest success – union support for the liberalization 
bill – but to a broader audience it confirmed the widespread negative views of the 
arrogance and detachedness of ‘the political class’. And while the combination of 
the three laws into one package deal had been instrumental in accelerating the par-
liamentary process, it now proved instrumental in rallying very diverse social 
forces into a heterogeneous alliance of opposition to the bill.14  
 The least surprising opposition came from the unions of the ICE, who feared 
the loss of employment and benefits. Other unions of public employees quickly 
closed ranks, fearing similar initiatives in their own sector if the country’s liberali-
zation course were pushed forward. From teachers to oil workers, unions staged 
solidarity strikes and called for members to participate in the anti-Combo-
demonstrations.  
 These mobilizations were soon joined by the university students. This needs 
explanation as these students came mainly from upper or middle sectors of society, 
and for them the ‘heroic’ days of the ICE’s role in national development seemed to 
be from distant history. In addition, since the students had a disproportionately 
high interest in Internet use, they seemed a prime target group for the argument 
that the state monopoly blocked the dynamic development of the new information 
technologies. However, the majority of the students did not perceive the Combo 
11
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law as a means to improving these services but instead as part and parcel of a 
broader agenda of liberalization which they opposed. This combined with a wide-
spread disenchantment with the political establishment, so that the Combo del ICE 
law became the case to articulate dissatisfaction that went far beyond the telecom-
munications issues in the narrow sense that it implied. Following the students’ 
demonstrations and teacher strikes, secondary students also joined the street pro-
tests. Practically all the ecological associations in the country joined against the 
Combo del ICE, in particular galvanized by article 119 of the law that facilitated 
the building of new hydroelectric plants in nature reserves by private companies.  
 Another unexpected, but highly important, sector participating in the protests 
against the liberalization law was the country’s peasantry. Pressured by the fall of 
world market prices for a number of major agricultural products, peasant organiza-
tions across the country had been mobilizing their bases to demand increased gov-
ernment support. These rural protests rapidly fused with the anti-Combo demon-
strations in the cities. Particularly in the countryside, appreciation of the ICE’s role 
as a cherished institution of development and social integration was still very much 
present; and it was in the rural areas that the privatization of services raised par-
ticularly strong fears of losing the ICE’s developmental commitment. The peas-
ants’ principal form of protest was to block overland roads, a measure that greatly 
disrupted transportation and economic activities and exerted a strong pressure on 
the government to act. 
 In the political arena, the ‘defence of the ICE’ also drew support from dissi-
dents among both the dominant parties. In the case of the PLN, Ottón Solís, the 
former planning minister of Óscar Arias’, led the dissidents. After resigning his 
office in the Arias administration in the 1980s, he had remained a loyal party 
member and parliamentarian; but now he formally broke with the PLN to form his 
own Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC).15 Another important actor in the institu-
tional political arena was the country’s ombudswoman (Defensora de los Habitan-
tes), Sandra Piszk, who spoke out energetically against the Combo law in the name 
of the politically unorganized ‘silent majority’. 
 In fact, while it was important for the protest coalition that it could unite het-
erogeneous social forces under a common goal, it was even more vital for its suc-
cess that it could count on broad, though less visible, support from the population 
at large. Opinion polls left little doubt that the country’s ‘silent majority’ viewed 
the demonstrations favourably. A survey conducted in May 2000 showed a solid 
two-thirds majority of those interviewed supporting the protests (Unimer-La 
Nación 2000). More telling still is that no less than 86.9 per cent agreed to the 
statement that ‘protests organized by some groups received spontaneous support by 
the population’ (Unimer-La Nación 2000). The poll also confirmed the weight of 
the widespread disenchantment with the ‘political class’, as no less than 93.7 per 
cent of those interviewed agreed that ‘the protests were a message to the PLN and 
PUSC that the Costa Ricans are tired of what they have done to the country’ (Uni-
mer-La Nación 2000).  
 The scope and aggressiveness of the anti-Combo protests reached a level of 
conflict unknown in the country’s recent history. When after two weeks the social 
unrest showed no signs of subsiding, on 3 April 2000, the government decided to 
withdraw the law.16 The government had staked a lot, nationally and internation-
ally, on the reform. In fact, in the face of street protests President Miguel Angel 
Rodríguez had at first remained committed to pushing the law through ‘no matter 
12
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what’; it was additional pressure from three different directions that finally forced 
him to give in.17  
 One rather unexpected source of increasing pressure was from business inter-
ests. The road blockades not only affected agricultural products, which rotted due 
to lack of transport, but also companies such as Intel, whose Costa Rican-based 
microprocessor plant suffered disruption of its electricity supply and blocked ac-
cess to the airport. While the private sector largely supported the liberalization law 
in principle, their more immediate concern was a return to normal business condi-
tions. And if the government could not restore order by force, business spokesmen 
urged the government to back down.18  
 Pressure also came from the president’s party itself. When the protests did not, 
as expected, subside after the passing of the law, fears grew that the conflict might 
jeopardize the party’s long-term political perspectives. Delegates and party mem-
bers calculated that the longer the government kept to its unpopular project, the 
deeper the rift between the party and the electorate would be.  
 The third element pressuring the government into retreat came from the judici-
ary system. About ten days after the law had been passed, word began to spread 
that the country’s highest constitutional court, the Sala Cuarta, would suspend the 
law on the grounds of procedural mistakes. At this point, even for the govern-
ment’s hardliners, it no longer made sense to stand by the bill. The question could 
no longer be answered as to why the government should keep on fighting at a 
highly political price when two weeks later the Sala Cuarta would overrule the law 
anyway. Indeed the constitutional court revoked the law package on 18 April, less 
than a month after it had been passed (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de 
Justicia 2000).  
 ‘Defending the ICE!’, as the main slogan of the anti-Combo coalition went, was 
about more than just a specific institution; it virtually became a plebiscite in de-
fence of the old social welfare state model.19 Telecom liberalization was embedded 
in an overarching paradigmatic shift towards a different development model, and 
the protests and reactions it triggered took it for nothing less.  
Lessons learned? The political feedback effects of the liberalization bill 
The IDB report on the ‘Politics of Policies’ puts a special emphasis on the argu-
ment that ‘policy reforms often have feedback effects on the policymaking game’ 
and that these should be given special consideration when opting for policy choices 
(IDB 2005, 8). There could hardly be a clearer case for this than the telecom liber-
alization initiatives in Costa Rica, in which the struggle over the Combo bill be-
came a catalyst for the collapse of the traditional two-party system. 
 An opinion poll taken a few months after the ICE conflict showed a strong con-
tinuity of the trends diagnosed by Seligson (2002): a clear majority of Costa Ricans 
supported democracy as their preferred political system, but at the same time an 
equally clear majority showed discontent with ‘the politicians’. They sharply criti-
cized the major parties and felt ill-represented by them.20  
 While the continent-wide opinion polls by Latinobarómetro21 showed similar 
levels of disenchantment, the political consequences were varied. In Costa Rica, it 
was the opposition to the liberalization bill that became a catalyst for the articula-
tion of this discontent, which until then had found only insufficient voice in the 
political arena. This crystallized in the 2002 presidential elections when PLN and 
13
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 84, April 2008  |  13 
 
PUSC together fell to 63 per cent of the vote, after having obtained 92 per cent in 
the previous five elections (Lehoucq 2005, 142). PLN dissident Otton Solís, who 
had broken with the party over the ICE bill, ran as candidate of his own improvised 
party, the Partido Acción Ciudadana, PAC (Citizen Action Party). Campaigning 
on a platform that could be summarized as ‘Old PLN,’ opposing the liberalization 
course taken since 1982 (Solís 2001), he virtually split the PLN vote, gaining no 
less than 26.2 per cent. 
 The PUSC managed to escape the electorate’s punishing vote essentially be-
cause its party leadership had already suffered defeat well before Election Day. 
The candidate favoured by the PUSC leadership lost the party’s primaries to Abel 
Pacheco, a PUSC deputy in the Legislative Assembly and popular TV commenta-
tor, in a vote that was widely seen as a victory for the rank-and-file members over 
the party’s entrenched hierarchy. Pacheco’s perceived challenge to the party hier-
archy became crucial for his ability to capitalize on the discontent with the gov-
ernment while maintaining most of the PUSC’s traditional vote, thus enabling him 
to win the presidency. In these elections, the end of bipartidism became particu-
larly evident in Congress, as parties not aligned with the PLN or the PUSC were 
holding 37 per cent of the seats. 
 As to telecommunications, after the political disaster of the Combo law, the 
majority parties quickly distanced themselves from the project. The government 
party’s parliamentary leader, Eliseo Vargas, declared the break-up of the monopoly 
to no longer be an option, since ‘there are political and social realities we have to 
respect’ (La Nación, 27 October 2000). He summed up the ‘lessons learned’ as 
follows:  
The Costa Rican populace has been very clear, and it has said ‘No’ to the open-
ing up of telecommunications and electricity. [...] We are no masochists, we 
will not insist on something to which ‘No’ has been said. Any such rumours are 
malicious. Let me be very clear about this: the Combo has died, and it has died 
forever (El Semanario 2001, 7).  
In the following weeks, the government signalled a change of course. First to dis-
appear was the alarmist discourse that had linked the nation’s fate to the passing of 
the ICE law. Instead, the government started what it regarded as a ‘second best 
option’: the modernization of the telecom sector under the state-monopoly of the 
ICE. The appointment of Guy de Téramond, the country’s leading informatics pro-
fessor and highly respected ‘father of the Internet in Costa Rica’, as the new Minis-
ter for Science and Technology, symbolically marked the government’s commit-
ment to invest in the new digital technologies. This was flanked by the launch of 
the ‘Digital Agenda’ programme which included numerous state-led initiatives for 
infrastructure investments, diffusion of access, and the integration of the new tech-
nologies in public institutions, the education and health sectors, and in small and 
medium businesses (Presidencia de la República 2001).22 However, this pro-active 
attitude was not to last long. Guy de Téramond was replaced after only two years 
in office, and as early as in August 2002, the government returned to the policy of 
draining the ICE’s resources, obliging it to contribute US$ 13.5 million to the state 
budget (La Nación 26 September 2002).  
 While most domestic political actors still traumatized by the Combo experience 
kept a low profile on the issue, in 2002, telecom liberalization forcefully returned 
to the Costa Rican agenda as part of the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
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(CAFTA). CAFTA promised improved access for Central American products into 
the U.S. market in exchange for further opening the Central American economies 
to U.S. companies. While the initial draft included provisions to fully open the 
telecommunications sector to private competition, the Costa Rican government 
renegotiated this part. It conceded to opening Internet services, mobile telephony, 
and data-network services, but not the ICE’s monopoly on main line telephony and 
electricity. On 25 January 2004, the Costa Rican government finalized negotiations 
with the USA and joined CAFTA – pending ratification by the U.S. Congress and 
Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly.  
 The Pacheco government was eager to point out that the agreement was not a 
‘Combo reloaded’. Minister of Foreign Commerce, Alberto Trejos, argued that ‘the 
ICE will not be adversely affected – it will be strengthened by a modern legislation 
and it maintains its monopoly in what it does best: the generation of electricity and 
the provision of main line telephony’ (La Nación 28 January 2004). However, the 
anti-Combo alliance felt that the government ‘insisted on something to which “No” 
has been said’. In particular, critics pointed to the fact that the activities singled out 
for liberalization were those that generated much of the state company’s revenues 
to maintain its socially and geographically inclusive pattern of mainline provision 
and low user tariffs (Fumero Paniagua 2004). 
 Moreover, once again telecom liberalization came with CAFTA as a package 
deal. While the government unbundled the Combo bill, separating main line te-
lephony and electricity from mobile telephony and Internet services, it explicitly 
embedded telecom liberalization in the even broader scheme of the free trade 
agreement. Again, this packaging helped heterogeneous social groups to join forces 
in opposition, CAFTA now took the Combo’s place of galvanizing protest in de-
fence of the ‘Costa Rican model’. President Pacheco became a staunch defendant 
of CAFTA by depicting the horror of sacrificing hundred thousands of jobs if 
CAFTA were not ratified (La Nación 29 January 2004). However, while CAFTA 
was ratified in the USA, the Dominican Republic (for which it was re-baptized as 
‘DR-CAFTA’) and all other Central American states in 2004 and 2005, the Costa 
Rican president, fearing renewed social unrest, decided to leave the task of taking 
it to the Legislative Assembly to his successor.  
 In the meantime, political fallout reached new dimensions. Corruption scandals 
shook the country, most of which were associated precisely with the telecommuni-
cations sector.23 In the autumn of 2004, the Costa Rican public witnessed the spec-
tacle of two former presidents being arrested on corruption charges, while a third 
one came under investigation. In addition, President Pacheco himself came under 
fire for dubious campaign financing. By 2005 all hopes put on him by the elector-
ate had been dashed, and opinion polls showed him getting the poorest ratings of 
any Costa Rican president in decades (CID Gallup 2005).  
 Against this background the 2006 presidential elections came to mark a water-
shed, sealing the end of Costa Rica’s traditional bipartidism.24 The governing party, 
PUSC, fell to a mere 3.5 per cent of the presidential vote (7.8 per cent in the Legis-
lative Assembly). The pro-establishment vote rallied around the PLN’s candidate, 
former president and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Óscar Arias. But the candidate 
staunchly critical of liberalization, Otton Solís, continued his rise, obtaining 39.8 
per cent of the vote and losing to Arias by a mere 1.1 percentage points, or 18,000 
votes (Wilson 2007, 715). 
 Since assuming office in May 2006, President Arias made it a key issue of his 
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government to push ahead with the CAFTA agreement. In the context of this free 
trade agreement, telecommunications liberalization once again has become part 
and parcel of the broader dispute over the country’s overall economic model. The 
conflict over this issue brought a new institutional mechanism into play: in 2002, a 
constitutional reform had introduced the possibility of a binding popular referen-
dum, and CAFTA became its first test case. As the opposition had threatened to 
collect the signatures needed for a referendum, the Arias government pre-empted 
this move by calling for a referendum itself. After a massive campaign in which 
the dominant media almost unisono echoed the government’s pro-CAFTA posi-
tion, the referendum, finally held on 7 October 2007, resulted in a narrow 51.6 over 
48.4 per cent victory in favour of the agreement. The closeness of the referendum 
result ratified the profound division running through Costa Rican society rather 
than representing a forceful mandate for liberalization. As a consequence, as of this 
writing it remains very unclear whether the Legislative Assembly will actually pick 
up the task and pass the enabling laws necessary for the ratification of the CAFTA 
agreement.  
Conclusions 
The IDB’s 2006 report on ‘the politics of policies’ rightly points out that discuss-
ing the pros and cons of specific policy designs will not suffice to explain the pol-
icy outcomes and their real-world effects if it does not consider adequately the dy-
namics of the policy-making process. If the report argues that ‘the political process 
and the policymaking are inseparable’ (IDB 2005, 4) and that ‘to ignore the link 
between them when pursuing policy change may lead to failed reforms and dashed 
expectations’ (IDB 2005, 4), the Costa Rican case is second to none in illustrating 
the validity of this argument. 
 At the same time, however, our analysis also shows the shortcomings of an 
overly technocratic understanding of the ‘politics of policies’. The failure of reform 
was not only due to policy-makers’ tactical errors in steering the project through 
‘the messy world of politics’ (IDB 2005, 4). While a number of specific decisions 
that negatively affected the viability of the liberalization initiative have been iden-
tified here, only a more holistic view can put these into proportion. This must take 
into account the specific historical trajectory of the country, as the support for pol-
icy change is likely to be all the greater as the citizenry becomes more dissatisfied 
with the preceding state of things; it must also take into account the inevitable link 
between ‘politics’ and ‘policies’, as it is the content of policy choices that shapes 
the actors’ responses to it.  
 In these regards the conceptual framework of the telecommunications regime 
proved fruitful as they situated the specific reform project under scrutiny in the 
overarching economic and social transformation under way. Costa Rica’s pre-
liberalization telecommunications regime was one of the most socially inclusive 
anywhere in the Third World. As a consequence, to large sectors of the population 
the expected downside of opening up the state monopoly outweighed its promises. 
Hence, it was indeed the content of policy that was at the root of the protests 
against it. Moreover, widening the focus on the social and economic model in which 
the reform was embedded provided the key to understanding why the telecom bill of 
2000 provoked a conflict that went far beyond an issue of sectorial policy choice, and 
amounted to a virtual plebiscite on the country’s development model.  
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 The case study also highlights the feedback effects of policy reform on the po-
litical actors themselves. The bipartisan agreement on the liberalization bill had 
secured a majority of more than 80 per cent in parliament. It would have been a 
success case for a ‘politics of policies’-minded reform process if it had indeed been 
backed by similar public support. While initially there was some outreach to civil 
society groups, in the end the citizenry entered into consideration essentially as a 
factor to be kept away from the decision-making process, as both parties joined 
forces to accelerate the legislative passing of the bill in order to keep sufficient 
distance between this and the next national elections.  
 The successful negotiation of the party elites turned out to be all the more coun-
terproductive as it increased the popular sense of an alienated ‘political class’ that, 
instead of representing society’s plural positions, closed ranks on a policy measure 
about whose unpopularity it was well aware. Against the background of this crisis 
of representation it was precisely this bipartisan agreement that became the catalyst 
for the disintegration of Costa Rica’s half a century old two-party-system.  
 Whereas the IDB’s report on the ‘politics of policies’ warns of the ‘trade-off 
between representativeness (or inclusiveness) and policy effectiveness’ (IDB 2005, 
157), the analysis of the Costa Rican case makes a point quite to the contrary: in-
stead of a trade-off, there is a direct causal link between both, as precisely the lack 
of representativeness can crucially undermine policy effectiveness.  
* * *  
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1. The term ‘telecommunications’ encompasses the telephone system as well as other forms of data 
transmission such as, historically, telegraph, telex or fax, and more recently, of course, the wide ar-
ray of digital network-based information technologies.  
2. The United States was one of the few countries where telecom services were not provided by a 
public monopoly, but by a private firm, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). 
It operated essentially on a monopoly basis, but since the passing of the Communications Act of 
1934, it did so within a sophisticated regulatory framework overseen by the governmental Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the world’s first stand-alone telecommunications regulator. 
3. A significant share of the revenues raised through privatization, however, went into servicing the 
foreign debt. Argentina, which in 1989 became the second country on the continent to privatize its 
telecom company, presents an illustrative case: the company was sold solely for debt certificates 
(Schvarzer 2000, 13).  
4. On the role of the network-based digital information and communication technologies in the drive 
for telecom liberalizations see Hoffmann (2004).  
5. This is confirmed by the country studies in Noam (1998).  
6. Again, the conclusion drawn by the ITU (2000, 3) is sobering: ‘The glitter of privatization has 








households have a fixed telephone. Even though a large proportion of the population is still without 
a phone, according to conventional statistics, there is hardly any unmet demand for telecommunica-
tions services in the region. The main reason for this is that local access prices (monthly subscrip-
tion) have generally risen, excluding a great part of the population from the market.’ 
7. Author’s interview in San José, 27 April 2001.  
8. On the crisis and economic policies of the 1980s, see Fürst (1990), Rovira Mas (1989), Reuben 
Soto (1988), and Sojo (2004, 13-16). 
9. Regarding the structural adjustment programme, Sojo (2004, 45) speaks of the ‘external tutelage 
and conditionality of the international organisms that introduces incentives for the reform but at the 
same time adds elements of additional tensions’. While the author adds that this ‘phase of tutelage’ 
ends in 1994 – that is, well before the liberalization project of the ‘Combo’ – it certainly describes 
in strong words the international framework in which its precedents were developed which pre-
pared the ground for the later initiatives. 
10. The following section draws, aside from the explicitly given references, on numerous interviews by 
the author during a field stay in Costa Rica in April 2001, a systematic analysis of the country’s 
leading newspaper, La Nación, and the press bulletins of the Legislative Assembly as well as 
documents of actors involved, in part found in the archives of the Fundación Acceso (San José). 
For well-documented analyses of the politics of the privatization of Costa Rican telecommunica-
tions see also Haglund (2006), Sojo (2004), and Bull (2005, particularly chapter 4). 
11. The creation of the Sala Cuarta in 1989 had been part of a judicial reform largely supported by the 
Inter-American Development Bank and meant to foster free market development (Wilson et al. 
2004). However, as Wilson et al. point out, its effect on policy-making has not been quite that, and 
they take the Sala Cuarta’s role in the liberalization of telecommunications as a case in point (Wil-
son et al. 2004, 525-527). 
12. The bill’s official name is: ‘Ley para el mejoramiento de servicios públicos de electricidad y tele-
comunicaciones y de la participación del Estado’. 
13. Besides the three delegates of the left-wing Fuerza Democrática, this was one representative each 
from the Partido Acción Laborista Alajuelense, the Partido Renovación Costarricense, the Partido 
Integración Nacional, and the Movimiento Libertario. 
14. This was admitted even by President Rodríguez, who in hindsight lamented that ‘the unified legis-
lation generated a multi-coloured and diverse, but also unified opposition front’ (cited in Sojo 
2004:28, translation BH).  
15. Within the governing PUSC, it was ex-President Rodrigo Carazo (1978-1982) who led a ‘National 
Citizens’ Front’ (Frente Cívico Nacional) against the liberalization law and was supported by, 
amongst others, the social-Christian trade union Confederación de Trabajadores Rerum Novarum.  
16. To save face, the government did not cancel the law altogether, but called for a 60-day freeze to 
open up a national dialogue. A ‘Mixed Commission’ (Comisión Mixta) was set up and a broad 
spectrum of political and social actors invited to discuss and reformulate the bill. However, this was 
more a conciliatory measure than an actual attempt to produce and implement a new law.  
17. The following draws on one of the President’s closest advisors who on the condition of anonymity 
recounted the political dynamics of the law’s withdrawal from the executive’s perspective (inter-
view with the author 28 April 2001 in San José).  
18. It is worth underscoring that the Costa Rican government lacked the option for ‘restoring order’ by 
repressive force. The use of the country’s police for a large-scale repressive action against non-
violent protest with broad public support would have shaken the foundations of the country’s po-
litical and social system so profoundly that it was excluded. Moreover, the government was well 
aware of its limited practical ability to implement any such a repressive strategy. In the words of the 
anonymous Presidential advisor cited above: ‘In any other country the government would declare a 
state of emergency, and if strikes would endanger the national electricity generation, the army 
would take over the power plants and guarantee at least a minimum of electricity supply. In Costa 








institution which technically would be able to operate it.’  
19. In Bull’s (2005) comparative study on telecom reform in Central America, this is reflected in the 
title of the very chapter on Costa Rica which reads: ‘Costa Rica: In Defense of the Welfare State’ 
(Bull 2005, 82-128). See also Haglund (2006, 34ff).  
20. La Nación, 11 September 2000: ‘Desilusión y esperanza en ticos’; 12 September 2000: ‘Fuerte 
apoyo a la democracia ... pero crítica a los partidos y poderes del Estado’; and, 14 September 2000: 
‘Dura crítica a partidos’.  
21. See the time series database provided by the Corporación Latinobarómetro at http://www.latino 
barometro.org.  
22. For a more detailed analysis of these initiatives in expanding the digital technologies see Hoffmann 
(2004, 119-137) and Téramond (2000).  
23. On the corruption scandals and their political implications see Lehoucq (2005), Salom (2005), and 
Peeler (2006).  
24. Some argue that a new bipartidism is emerging, with the new PLN as a more liberal than social 
democratic force and Otton Solís PAC as taking the role of a left to centre ‘old PLN’. However, 
such an arrangement would still mark a departure from the type of accommodating bipartidism that 
had been characteristic of Costa Rica, as these two parties are much more divided over the political 
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